

Gatekeeper XProtect And MacOS Malware Artefacts

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GATEKEEPER, XPROTECT & MACMALWARE · A GUIDE FOR UK LAWYERS
Gatekeeper, XProtect and macOS Malware Artefacts
What Ran, What Was Blocked, and Whether "a Virus Did It" Holds Up
COMPUTER FORENSICS LAB'S ABOUT THE AUTHOR
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FULL CHAIN-OF-CUSTODY DOCUMENTATION
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Executive summary
The headline point: Macs get malware, and Apple's Gatekeeper and XProtect leave artefacts showing what ran, was blocked or was quarantined, so those artefacts, with the wider record, both help investigate a genuine compromise and allow the "a virus did it" defence to be tested even-handedly, at honest confidence.
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19. The laboratory investigates malware and does not create or deploy it. Through cflab.uk and e-discovery.uk,
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REFERENCEGlossarySources and authoritative referencesDISCLAIMERS HOW A
SPECIALIST LABORATORY CAN ASSISTWorking with Computer Forensics Lab19. The
laboratory investigates malware and does not create or deploy it. This guide completes the
macOSSpeak to a forensic examiner, not a
salesperson.INSTRUCTTHELABNEWENQUIRIEEMAIL - DISCOVERY

Questions and answers

Someone says "a virus did it". How do you test that?

Even-handedly, by asking specific questions (

Why the urgency about not shutting the Mac down?

Because compromise evidence is often volatile (

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