

How To Design Defensible Keyword Searches

Learn to design effective and defensible keyword searches for e-discovery. This guide covers term selection, syntax, negotiation, documentation, and common pitfalls, ensuring your search methodology is robust and withstands scrutiny.

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KEYWORDSEARCHDESIGN · A GUIDE FOR UK LAWYERS How to Design Defensible Keyword Searches Terms, Syntax and the Method That Survives the Other Side's Scrutiny COMPUTER FORENSICS LAB

§ ABOUT THE AUTHOR PREPARED BY COMPUTER FORENSICS LAB E-DISCOVERY TEAM ESTABLISHED 2007 · LONDON ISO 17025-ALIGNED PROCEDURES SEARCH PROTOCOL DESIGN

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§ 01 · ORIENTATION Executive summary THE HEADLINE POINT: TERMSCOMEFROMTHEDATA ' SOWNVOCABULARY, SYNTAXIS ENGINEEREDPERPLATFORM, ANDEVERYCHOICEISTESTEDANDDOCUMENTEDBEFORE IT IS AGREED

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§ 09 · IN THE WILD Worked examples EXAMPLE1 ·

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THE WILDCARD THAT AT THE BUDGET EXAMPLE 3 ·

THE NULL RETURN THAT WAS AN OCR POSTURE

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Technical limitations

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WORDING · SEARCH METHODOLOGY PART A GRAPH FOR THE DRD / PROTOCOL

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§ HOW A SPECIALIST LABORATORY CAN ASSIST Working with Computer Forensics Lab
Speak to a forensic examiner, not a salesperson. INSTRUCT THE LAB
NEW ENQUIRIES EMAIL - DISCOVERY

Questions and answers

How many search terms should a list have?

As many as the issues need and no more: quality of construction beats length: a tested thirty-term list with proximity engineering outperforms an untested hundred every time, and costs less to run, review and defend. The DRD conversation goes better with a short list you can justify term-by-term than a long one you cannot.

The other side proposes terms hitting hundreds of thousands of documents. Must we accept?

No: you counter with arithmetic: hit counts, sampled precision, review cost per term: and propose refinements (proximity, intersections, date limits) that keep the concept while shedding the noise: Example 2's renegotiation is the template, and courts consistently reward the party holding numbers rather than adjectives. Acceptance under deadline pressure of an untested term is the one concession that cannot be walked back cheaply.

Our searches returned nothing on a central issue. Can we certify that?

Only after the §8 routing: is the relevant estate actually text-searchable (Example 3's question first), did the terms speak the custodians' register, has a participant-and-date pull been run as the safety net? A null certified over those checks is solid; a null certified instead of them is a future application with your name on it.

Do keyword searches work on Whats App and Teams data?

They run, but the vocabulary and the unit change: in form a l spelling, fragments-across-messages, emoji and voice notes defeat email-register terms: so messaging sources get adapted terms from the guide 63 harvest, conversation-level retrieval, and honest declaration in the protocol that the methodology differs per source. Searching chat with the email list and reporting the nulls is a recognised way to miss the case.

Are keyword searches still acceptable now TAR exists?

Fully: PD 57AD contemplates both, and mature practice combines them: keywords for the nameable (parties, projects, references), TAR and analytics for the conceptual and the unnamed, with the DRD recording which tool covers what: guide 89 treats the TAR half. What is fading is not keywords but untested keywords presented as a complete methodology.

Who should draft the list: lawyers or the provider?

Both, in sequence: lawyers own the issues layer and the legal judgements (scope, NOTs, proportionality); the provider owns the dialect, the testing and the engineering; the custodians own the vocabulary nobody else has. The protocol file is where the three meet: and a list drafted by any one of them alone carries that author's characteristic blind spot.

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