

IOS Encrypted Apps And Secure Messengers

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ENCRYPTED APPS & SECURE MESSENGERS · A GUIDE FOR UK LAWYERS
IOS Encrypted Apps and Secure Messengers
Signal, Telegram and Wickr: What Encryption Protects, What It Does Not, and What the Device Still Gives Up
COMPUTER FORENSICS LAB
§ ABOUT THE AUTHOR
PREPARED BY COMPUTER FORENSICS LAB E-DISCOVERY TEAM
ESTABLISHED 2007 · LONDON
ISO 17025-ALIGNED PROCEDURES
SECURE-MESSENGER FORENSICS
FULL CHAIN-OF-CUSTODY DOCUMENTATION
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Executive summary
The headline point: secure messengers like Signal, Telegram and Wickr protect messages in transit and against interception, not from the very device that displays them, so if a conversation is readable on the phone it is in principle recoverable from the phone, subject to each app's own on-device protections and deletion, which vary greatly.
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SPECIALIST LABORATORY CAN ASSISTWorking with Computer Forensics LabSpeak to a forensic examiner, not a salesperson.INSTRUCTTHELABNEWENQUIRIESEMAILE - DISCOVERY

Questions and answers

Aren't apps like Signal simply unrecoverable?

No, that misunderstands what the encryption protects (

So can you always recover secure-messenger conversations?

No, and claim in g so would be the opposite error (

Does using a secure messenger look suspicious?

Not in itself, and it is treated neutrally (

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