

# What Happens During EDiscovery Processing

E-discovery processing is the critical, often overlooked, stage between data collection and document review. This guide demystifies the process, explaining how decisions about exceptions, de-NISTing, and filters shape the final document set, ensuring defensibility and accuracy in electronic disclosure.

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EDISCOVERY PROCESSING · A GUIDE FOR UK LAWYERS What Happens During e Discovery Processing? The Black Box Between Collection and Review, Opened for Lawyers COMPUTER FORENSICS LAB

§ ABOUT THE AUTHOR PREPARED BY COMPUTER FORENSICS LAB E-DISCOVERY TEAM ESTABLISHED 2007 · LONDON ISO 17025-ALIGNED PROCEDURES EDM PROCESSING PRACTICE EXCEPTION & RECONCILIATION REPORTING CPR PART 35 EXPERT REPORT S FULL CHAIN-OF-CUSTODY DOCUMENTATION

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Speak to a forensic examiner, not a salesperson. INSTRUCT THE LAB  
NEW ENQUIRY EMAIL - DISCOVERY

## Questions and answers

### **Why did 400 GB of data become only 40,000 documents?**

Because volume and count measure different things: containers expand into items, then de NISTing removes the operating system's furniture, date and scope filters remove the out-of-range, and deduplication collapses the copies: each step with a recordable count. The right response to the question is Example 2's table; suspicion is only warranted when no table exists.

### **What actually happens to files that cannot be processed?**

They become exceptions: logged by category (encrypted, corrupt, unsupported, empty), triaged, and either resolved through the §8 routes: credentials, source re-pulls, counterpart copies, specialist tooling: or consciously accepted and listed. What must never happen is silent disappearance: the exception list is disclosure work- product, and Example 1 is why.

### **Is it safe to remove "system files" from the review set?**

Almost always: de NISTing removes known-hash operating system and application files with no user content, and doing so is standard, published-list, recorded practice. The caveat is the matter where system artefacts are the evidence: user-activity and exfiltration cases per guides 41 and 61: which opt out of the cull for the relevant sources, knowingly and in writing.

### **Our opponent's production has emails whose attachments are missing. Innocent?**

Sometimes (source-side stubbing, genuine transmission failures): but it is exactly what broken family handling looks like, and the question is answerable: ask for their family reconciliation and unitisation settings per §11. A producing party that preserved families can say so in a sentence; one that cannot has Example 3 ahead of it.

### **Can we change processing decisions after review has started?**

Yes, with discipline: new ranges, scopes or unitisation are run as documented deltas: reprocessed, reconciled, overlaid: never silently merged, so the workspace's arithmetic stays coherent and prior review work maps cleanly onto the corrected set. Example 3's fix is the model; its costs are the argument for getting settings instructed the first time.

### **Does processing alter the underlying evidence?**

No: it derives from preserved originals: text, images, normalised fields: while the collected sources stay sealed and hashed, and any produced native is traceable back to them. What processing does alter is visibility: which is the whole point of governing it, since a document invisible to search and review is, functionally, undisclosed. cflab. u k · e-discove r y. u k

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